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In Re Report and Recommendation of
June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F.Supp.
1219 (D.D.C. 1974)), the court stressed
that here, unlike other reported cases
upholding the naming of unindicted co-
conspirators, all legal remedies were in-
adequate, and all forums of redress were
closed. 439 F.Supp. at 205, 209.
Clearly then, Judge Young wrote, the
indictment and related material naming
Jordan as a co-conspirator involved in
criminal activity was an improper exercise
of the grand jury function. 439 F.Supp at
205.
Jordan's Fifth Amendment argument
turned on his alleged deprivation of his
due process rights to be permitted the
protection of the federal indictment pro-
cess secured under the Fifth Amendment
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. The Court agreed, noting that
whether or not the Supreme Court has
effectively eliminated due process protec-
tion of reputation claims arising out of
state action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, see
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976),
where, as here, a federal grand jury fails to
establish a finding of probable cause by
naming, but not indicting the named co-
conspirators, there is an injury transgress-
ing the "guarantee of a right to be free of
injury secured by the federal Constitution
in the indictment clause of the Fifth
Amendment and by other federal laws."
439 F.Supp. at 208.
Since the "only legitimate means by
which the federal grand jury could
publicly indicate such a finding of proba
ble cause was by the action of indicting
Jordan," and since Jordan lacked totally
any form or forum in which to challenge
the grand jury's action, the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection was properly invokable.





The unique facts of Tri-County Federal
Savings and Loan Association u. Lyle,
280 Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977), make
it one of first impression in Maryland. Ac-
cording to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, 33 Md.App. 46, 363 A.2d 642,
645, the peculiarities of Maryland law in
this case render the holdings of other ju-
risdictions of little assistance in its in-
terpretation.
In April, 1974, Lyle and his wife ex
ecuted a note to Tri-County for $60,000
at an interest of 8%,i in return for a loan
commitment from that financial institu
tion to enable the Lyles to build a home.
The note was secured by a deed of trust,
with the Savings & Loan as a beneficiary.
Tri-County's check for $60,000 was en-
dorsed by the Lyles at settlement, and
$15,000 was immediately disbursed to
the seller of the lot, upon which the Lyles
were to construct their house. The re-
mainder, $45,000, was paid over to the
defendant, Tri-County, where it was
placed into a non-escrow account. The
$45,000, according to the loan agree-
ment, was to be paid in nine installments
MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 49, §3 (1972) permits simple
interest not in excess of 6% annually to be charged,
except where there is a written agreement between
lender and borrower, in which case 8% simple in-
terest annually may be charged on the unpaid bal-
ance.
as work on the house progressed. Tri-
County also collected a $60 appraisal fee,
$10 for a credit report, and $90 for in-
spection fees, the first two fees being paid
to third parties. See generally, B.F. Saul
Co. v. West End Park, 250 Md. 707, 246
A.2d 591 (1968). Subsequently, the
Lyles abandoned the project, and in Sep-
tember, 1974, repaid the $15,000 plus
$573.29 interest which had accrued on
the full $60,000.2 Credit was given for
the $45,000 retained by the defendant,
and the $90 in inspection fees was
returned to the plaintiffs. Because it was
paid in accordance with the agreed upon
schedule, interest was computed on the
full $60,000.
The Lyles sued, contending that the
$60 appraisal fee, the $10 credit report
fee, and the 8% interest charged on the
$45,000 were usurious. Their claim of
$4,911.75 was based on the remedy
enunciated by the Maryland statute.3 The
trial court found that the fees were not in
excess of that allowed by the law and dis-
missed the suit.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed
the trial judge's disposition of the claim
regarding the interest on the $45,000 and
remanded the case. 33 Md.App. 46, 363
A.2d 642.
The Court of Appeals, after granting
certiorari, affirmed the lower appellate
court's holding that the credit appraisal
and inspection fees played no role in the
alleged usury. Secondly, the court held
that the Lyles were required to pay in
terest only on the unpaid balance of the
loan, $15,000, because they did not have
control of the remaining $45,000. Re
quiring the plaintiffs to pay interest on the
full $60,000 rendered the agreement
usurious. Id. at 76, 371 A.2d at 427.
2 In order to obtain relief in equity against a usurious
contract, ancient doctrine holds that the plaintiff
must tender moth the principal and the legal interest
which has accrued. Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md.Ch. 44
(1847).
1 MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 49, §8 (1972) articulates the
current usury law which might have allowed Tri
county to charge an interest rate of 10% because the
loan here was secured by residential real property. In
this case, however, this section was inapplicable
because the loan was executed before May 31, 1974,
the statute's effective date.
This section also allows a forfeiture of three times
the amount of interest and charges collected on any
loan in excess of the authorized interest and charges,
or the sum of $500.00, whichever is greater.




The long-standing doctrine of usury has
been defined by the Maryland courts as
the taking of more interest for the use of
money or forbearance than the law allows.
Scott v. Leary, 34 Md. 389 (1871). To
constitute usury, there must be: one, a
lending of money or forbearance to collect
money due; two, an agreement that the
money shall be returned; and three, more
than legal interest must be paid. Williams
v. Reynolds, 10 Md. 57 (1856). It is a
question of the lender's intention to exact
more than the allowable legal rate of in-
terest, Curozza v. Federal Finance &
Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332
(1925); however, nothing in the law of
usury prevents a borrower from paying
usurious interest, if he so desires. Kirsner
v. Sun Mortgage Co., 154 Md. 682, 141
A. 398 (1928). Intent to take excessive
interest is an essential element to estab-
lish usury. Beneficial Finance Co. v. Ad-
ministrator of Loan Laws, 260 Md. 430,
272 A.2d 644 (1971).
The court here, in reaching its decision
on whether interest should be charged on
the $45,000, emphasized the fact that
this amount was never under the Lyles'
control. In qualifying the issue of control,
the court indicated that had Tri-county
placed the money in an escrow account
there would have been no question as to
control, even if the escrow was subject to
restrictions. Id. at 73,371 A.2d at 426.
In its appeal, Tri-County contended
that where a loan agreement contemplates
that the entire amount of the loan is
available to the borrower immediately,
the fact that he leaves it with the lender
for some time period does not make the
transaction usurious, absent a showing of
intent to evade the law against usury.
Judge Singley, writing for the court, dis-
counted this rule by considering: one, that
the laws against usury ought to be stricly
enforced; and, two, that no subterfuge of
a lender will be permitted to shield a
usurious loan. Id. at 74-75,371 A.2d at
427. Although the heart of the rule is the
lender's intent to evade the usury laws,
the court does not base its holding on that
point; in fact, nowhere in the opinion
does the court attempt to determine ap-
pellant's actual intent in retaining the
$45,000. As to the concept of unpaid bal-
ance, the court reasoned that this balance
was the $15,000 and not the $45,000.
The $45,000, by being in Tri-County's
business account, was totally within its
control. When the Lyles repaid Tri-Coun-
ty, they needed only to pay the sum due,
i.e. $15,000 plus interest.
The court does not mention any
benefits which the appellant may have
received by keeping the loan in its acount
and under its control. Maryland case and
statutory law indicates that the intent of
the Maryland usury statute is to prevent a
lender from obtaining an unjust bonus or
commission. See e.g., Brenner v. Plitt,
182 Md. 348, 34 A.2d 853 (1943);
Maryland Ann. Code, Art. 49 (1972).
A final point not discussed by the court
is custom and usage in the trade. The
question is whether it is customary for
Maryland loan companies, when retaining
a portion of the proceeds, to place such
proceeds in a general business account
with a record of outstanding loans. Such a
custom would seem to be contrary to the
proscriptions of the Maryland usury
statute. While some states have ruled that
custom and usage cannot legalize usury,
the question of whether the practice is
usurious has often been influenced by
commercial custom.
The court's failure to address the ele-
ment of the lender's intent may have been
a serious oversight; the case could have
been remanded to determine if a usurious
intent on the part of the appellant existed.
It seems clear, however, that the decision
in Tri-County is in line with previous
decisions of the court. The appellant
lender, having attempted to exact an
amount in excess of the legal interest rate
by a rather ingenious method, was held to
be in violation of the Maryland usury







Of all the law's intrusions into the lives
of individuals, few seem more disruptive
than the one that severs the legal bond
between parent and child-the termina-
tion of parental rights.
There is substantial confusion regard-
ing the exact nature of parental rights. At-
tempts at clarification run from consider-
ing them as a trust relationship, a compact
balancing the parent's rights against
obligations, to a cluster of "rights to"-to
have custody, to visit, to choose a name,
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